Herschel Walker v. National Football League: A Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging the Propriety of the National Football League\u27s Four-or-Five Year Rule Under the Sherman Act by Farnsworth, A. Randall
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 4
4-15-1982
Herschel Walker v. National Football League: A
Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging the Propriety of
the National Football League's Four-or-Five Year
Rule Under the Sherman Act
A. Randall Farnsworth
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Contracts Commons, and the
Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. Randall Farnsworth Herschel Walker v. National Football League: A Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging the Propriety of the National
Football League's Four-or-Five Year Rule Under the Sherman Act, 9 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (1982)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol9/iss3/4
Herschel Walker v. National Football League: A
Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging the Propriety of
the National Football League's Four-or-Five
Year Rule Under the Sherman Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Herschel Walker may well be the best collegiate football player
in the country. In the recruiting battle between college football
teams to acquire talented players, he was the most sought after
athlete in the country,' 'vith good reason. As a running back in
high school, he ran for eighty-six touchdowns and 6,137 yards,
forty-five of the touchdowns and 3,167 of the yards in his senior
year alone.2 While attending the University of Georgia, Herschel
has continued to establish himself as a superior athlete. Compet-
ing on the Georgia track team, he achieved the status of a world
class sprinter by clocking a 10.19 time in the 100 meters.3 On the
gridiron, he set an NCAA freshman rushing record of 1,616 yards,4
finished third in the Heisman Trophy voting,5 and was the first
freshman in college football to be deemed a consensus All Ameri-
can in this century.6 During his sophomore year, he again
achieved All American status while racking up 1,903 yards rushing
and twenty-two touchdowns.7
Herschel's success has not gone unnoticed.8 Nelson Skalbania,
owner of the Canadian Football League's Montreal Alouettes, of-
fered him a contract to play in Canada. One would think that a
National Football League (NFL) team would share a similar inter-
1. Phillips, How 'Bout Them Dawgs?, TnE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 102.
2. Kirkpatrick, More Than Georgia's on his Mind, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug.
31, 1981, at 38, 42.
3. Den. Post, Dec. 31, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 5.
4. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 38.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 45.
7. During the regular season, Herschel ran for 1,819 yards and 20 touchdowns.
Denver Post, Dec. 31, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 4. In the Sugar Bowl, he added 84 yards
and two touchdowns. L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 1982, § Ill, at 16, col. 4.
8. In the 1980 election returns of Greene County, Georgia, he received three
write-in votes for President of the United States. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 42.
est 9 and select him in the NFL's annual player draft. Such is not
the case. No NFL team will draft Herschel for at least two more
years, the simple reason being that he is not old enough.
H. THE FOUR-OR-FIVE YEAR RULE
The National Football League has enacted a so-called "four-or-
five year rule" whereby an athlete is ineligible to play for, or be
drafted by, an NFL team unless one of three eligibility require-
ments are met. A prospective football player must have ex-
hausted his eligibility for college football, or five years must have
elapsed since the player first attended an institution of higher ed-
ucation, or he must have received a diploma from such an institu-
tion.10 This rule was enacted to provide for competitive balance
among the NFL member teams" and is still enforced today.12
Since Herschel is only a college sophomore, he has not met the
9. Gil Brandt, director of player personnel for the Dallas Cowboys, stated
that "[Herschel] Walker and Earl Campbell are the only two players I've ever
seen who could have gone straight from high school to the pros." Phillips, supra
note 1, at 102.
10. The NFL Constitution and By-Laws provide: "The only players eligible to
be selected in any Selection Meeting shall be those players who fulfill the eligibil-
ity standards prescribed in Article XII, § 12.1 of the Constitution and By-Laws of
the League." NAT'L FooTBALL LEAGUE, CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE NAT'L FOOT-
BALL LEAGUE art. XIV, § 14.2 (1976); and
No person shall be eligible to play or be selected as a player unless (1) all
college football eligibility of such player has expired, or (2) at least five
(5) years have elapsed since the player first entered or attended a recog-
nized junior college, college, or university, or (3) such player receives a
diploma from a recognized college or university prior to September 1st of
the next football season of the League....
Id. art. XII, § 12.1(A).
11. During the 1960's, stronger clubs such as the Green Bay Packers drafted
red shirts (college players who do not play for their college teams in a given year
but who retain their eligibility to play in a future year) enabling them to stockpile
future players in the circumstance where weaker clubs were not in a position to
do so. As a result, the League banned the drafting of red shirted college players
until they had actually completed their college careers. Rights of Professional Ath-
letes: Hearings on H.R. 2355 and H.R. 694 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51
(1975) (testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League).
There may be a serious question as to whether the NFL has been successful in
achieving parity within the League. See id. at 131 (letter from Roger E. Noll, Pro-
fessor of Economics); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-84 n.46 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Quirk & El Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports
League, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BusiNEss 33, 58 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
12. Following his sophomore year in college, Clarence Reece signed a contract
and played for the Canadian Football League during the 1974 season. In 1975 he
signed a contract with the Houston Oilers. Commissioner Rozelle disapproved the
contract on the grounds that Reece had not satisfied the NFL's eligibility require-
ments. Reece filed suit alleging the eligibility requirements constituted a group
boycott. When assured that no NFL team had encouraged Reece to withdraw from
college, the Commissioner rescinded his disapproval of the contract. L. SOBEL,
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 466 n.3 (1977).
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NFL's eligibility requirements and therefore may not participate
in the league. Should he wish to challenge this rule he might do
so in a manner similar to that chosen by Kenneth Linesman,
Spencer Haywood, and Joe Kapp when they challenged restric-
tive policies enacted by professional sports leagues.
Kenneth Linesman wished to play in the World Hockey Associ-
ation; however, he was only nineteen years old and league rules
required that he be twenty years old to compete in the league.13
He was drafted by the Birmingham Bulls and signed a contract in"
violation of the twenty-year-old rule. The President of the league
voided the contract. In the ensuing lawsuit, the court found that
the rule violated the Sherman Act14 and thus granted a prelimi-
nary injunction allowing Linesman to participate in the league.
Spencer Haywood challenged the National Basketball Associa-
tion's (NBA) four year rule when Commissioner Kennedy disap-
proved a contract he had signed with the Seattle Supersonics.
15
Judge Ferguson found that the rule violated the Sherman Act and
granted a preliminary injunction, allowing Haywood to play for
the Supersonics. The NBA responded by developing a "hardship
draft."16
Joe Kapp signed a contract to play for the NFL Boston Patriots;
however, he refused to sign a Standard Players Contract which
would bind him to the National Football League's Constitution
and By-Laws. Kapp played in eleven games for the Patriots
before the team, pursuant to an ultimatum by Commissioner Ro-
zelle, ordered Kapp to sign the Standard Players Contract or
leave the team. Kapp won the lawsuit which followed but to his
dismay, he received no offers to play for any NFL team.'
7
13. See notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text.
14. The Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. " 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
15. The four year rule provided that one could not play in the NBA until four
years after graduation from high school. The Commissioner disapproved the con-
tract because Haywood did not meet the requirements of the rule. See notes 76-85
infra and accompanying text.
16. The "hardship rule," or the "undergraduate eligibility rule," provides an
exception to the four year rule. It enables an impoverished athlete to petition the
Commissioner of the NBA for a hardship classification. Commissioner Kennedy
has liberally granted athletes this status.
17. The reasons for Kapp's inability to receive offers from NFL teams are un-
clear. See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
In Herschel's challenge to the NFL's four-or-five year rule, he
might announce that he has chosen to pursue a career in the
League and invite the NFL teams to select him in the annual
player draft. Once he was drafted he would then sign a contract
in violation of the four-or-five year rule. The league could then be
expected to void the contract. Herschel could then file a lawsuit
alleging that the rule constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of
the Sherman Act.18 On the other hand it is possible that league
teams would not draft Herschel for fear of sanctions being im-
posed by the League.19 Should this be the case, Herschel would
still be in a position to fie a suit against the NFL.20
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that a person
seeking to challenge the NFL's eligibility requirements will be
faced with a formidable task. It is likely that the League would
contest the lawsuit in order to keep its relations with college foot-
ball amicable. 21 It would also be extremely difficult for such an
athlete to absorb the staggering cost of confronting an unregu-
lated monopoly.22 Further, despite the fact that the Clayton Act
provides treble damages 23 for violation of the Sherman Act,24
since there is no assurance that Herschel could make an NFL
team, any claim for damages would be purely speculative and
subject to dismissal on a motion for summary judgment.25 . Since
the average antitrust suit takes from four to five years to reach
the Supreme Court,26 and since Herschel will be eligible to par-
ticipate in the NFL in two years, there is also the possibility that
Herschel would drop the action before the Supreme Court could
have an opportunity to decide the issue. If Herschel were granted
18. See note 14 supra.
19. The NFL provides for harsh punishment for teams who acquire players in
violation of the four-or-five year rule. "If a club violates this section, it shall be
subject to punishment by the Commissioner, such punishment shall provide for
the loss of selection choices of the offending club in the next or in succeeding Se-
lection Meetings up to and including the entire Selection List." NAT'L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE CONST. AND BY-LAwS FOR THE NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XII, § 12.1(B)
(1976) (emphasis added).
20. See notes 126-34 infra and accompanying text.
21. S. GALLNER, PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAME 27 (1974). See also notes
87-94 infra and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 27-28.
23. The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefore ... and shall recover threefold damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976).
24. As defined in 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976), the Sherman Act is included in the "an-
titrust laws" of 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
25. S. GALLNER, supra note 21, at 28.
26. Id. at 27. In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the
suit took eight years to reach the Supreme Court.
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a preliminary injunction, however, the League could be expected
to pursue the matter to prevent other collegiate athletes from
similarly attempting to enter the League.27
No doubt Herschel Walker was conscious of these obstacles
when he determined that it would be foolish to challenge the NFL
in court following his freshman year,28 and when he announced
his decision not to play football in Canada. In rejecting the Mon-
treal Alouette's offer, he stated, "I grew up in America, and I don't
think I should have to leave this country to make a living."29 The
question now becomes whether it is proper for the NFL to force
young athletes to make such a decision. Perhaps the courts may
soon be forced to decide the question, since Herschel has recently
stated that he is "going to think seriously about challenging the
[NFL draft] rule. ... 30
I. THE ANTrrRUST LAws
A. Underpinnings of the Sherman Act
The notion that each individual should be free in his trade or
undertaking took root during medieval times.3 1 During the period
of English history marked by the breakup of the guilds and broth-
erhoods, the common law rule against restraints began to de-
velop.3 2 Initially, all contracts in restraint of trade were deemed
to be injurious to the public as well as to the individuals who
made them, and the courts found such restraints to be unlawful
27. Since college athletes will probably attempt to follow Herschel's example
should he be successful in his attempt to enter the NFL, the case would fall into
the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine.
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
28. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 41.
29. Id.
30. Den. Post, Dec. 31, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 5.
31. 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTrrRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATIONS 1-21 (Matthew Bender 1981). The notion of freedom of trade
is derived from:
(1) implications of clauses in the Magna Carta relating to liberty of the
individual and of trade;
(2) medieval judges favored the principle, just as they favored the princi-
ple of freedom of alienation; and
(3) a hostile feeling by medieval judges toward all arbitrary restrictions
on personal liberty or property rights for which no legal justification
could be shown.
Holdsworth, Industrial Combinations and The Law in The Eighteenth Century, 18
MN. L. REV. 369, 371-72 (1934).
32. 16 J. VON KAuNowsiu, supra note 31, at 1-22 n.11.
and voidable, without regard to the surrounding circumstances. 33
This all-inclusive prohibition against restraints seriously im-
pinged upon everyday business transactions and was eventually
modified to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.34
The English common law prohibition against unreasonable re-
straints found an easy foothold in America.35 When faced with
the restraints and unfair trade practices of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, the common law became outdated, and was inade-
quate to cope with these problems.36 State statutes enacted in
the middle and late nineteenth century were only partially suc-
cessful in curbing competitive abuses which ranged across the
country.3 7 Given the economic condition of the times, it became
clear that the Federal Government would have to intervene.38
B. The Sherman Act
In 1890 Congress responded by enacting the Sherman Act.39
Read literally, this statute prohibits every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade.40 The courts, however, have
been reluctant to apply the literal meaning of the Sherman Act,
and as a result, two lines of cases have developed in interpreting
the statute. On one hand, the Supreme Court has stated that the
Sherman Act should be construed in the light of reason, and as
such, it only prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade.41 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has also stated that "certain
agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elabo-
rate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused, or the busi-
ness excuse for their use."42
33. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1911).
34. Id. at 55; 16 J. VON KALiNowsKI, supra note 31, at 1-23. In determining the
reasonableness of the restraint, the courts weighed the interests of the contracting
parties against the interests of the-general public. Id. at 1-26.
35. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 56-57; Hamilton, Common
Right; Due Process and Antitrust, 7 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 24, 29 (1940).
36. 16 J. VON KALINOWSxi, supra note 31, at 1-35.
37. Id. at 1-38.
38. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 50.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 14 supra.
40. Id. This appears to have been the approach applied by the courts in early
cases which dealt with the Sherman Act. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n,
171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897).
41. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1067 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (injunction reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
401 U.S. 1204 (1971)) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
42. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
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1. The Rule of Reason
The "rule of reason" was first announced in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States43 and is the standard which is usually applied
where anticompetitive practices are alleged under section one of
the Sherman Act.4 Under the rule of reason, the test of legality
is whether the restraint regulates and perhaps promotes competi-
tion, or whether it suppresses or destroys competition.45 Under
certain circumstances, however, the rule of reason has been re-
placed by a rule of per se illegality.
2. Per Se Illegality and Group Boycotts
The doctrine of per se illegality is the antitheses of the rule of
reason and was given birth in Eastern States Retail Lumber Deal-
ers' Association v. United States.4 6 In Eastern States, the Court
found that an agreement between retailers not to deal with whole-
salers who also sold at retail was in violation of the Sherman Act.
While the Court did not use the term per se in its opinion, it did
state that the actions taken "takes the case out of those normal
and usual agreements in aid of trade and commerce which may
be found not to be within the act, and puts them within the pro-
hibited class of undue and unreasonable restraints. . .."47
Cases following Eastern States have firmly established that
group boycotts46 or concerted refusals to deal49 are per se illegal
43. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice White
who dissented in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n and United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n. See note 40 supra.
44. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1976).
45. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). To deter-
mine the reasonableness of the restraint, the court ordinarily considers:
[T] he facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the re-
straint; and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, and
the purpose or end sought to be attained are all relevant facts.
Id.
46. 234 U.S. 600 (1914); see also, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 36 (1976).
47. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. at
612.
48. A group boycott is a concerted attempt by a group of competitors at one
level to protect themselves from competition from non-group members who seek
to compete at that level. Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
1978). See also L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTIrrRUST 230 (1977).
49. Technically a concerted refusal to deal is a method of enforcing or perpe-
trating a boycott. L. SuLLIvAN, supra note 48, at 230-31.
under the Sherman Act. The problem, however, arises in defining
the activities to which the per se label attaches.50 Preliminarily it
may be observed that the per se label is only appropriate where
the conduct is manifestly anticompetitive.51 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has handed down a number of decisions which
categorize the types of conduct which are deemed to be illegal per
se.52
Three cases are of particular importance in the development of
the per se approach to group boycotts. In Fashion Originators'
Guild, Inc. v. FTC,53 garment manufacturers formed a guild and
agreed not to deal with retailers who stocked garments copied by
other manufacturers from designs of the guild members. The
guild argued that the restrictions were reasonable in that they
prevented the immoral practice of "style piracy." The Court
noted that the designs could not be patented or copyrighted and
found the boycott illegal, stating: "[I]t was not error to refuse the
evidence offered, for the reasonableness of the methods pursued
by the combination to accomplish its unlawful objective is no
more material than would be the reasonableness of the prices
fixed by unlawful combination."54
The next decision in the development of the per se doctrine is
Klor's, Inc.. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 55 In delivering the deci-
50. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTI-
TUTE 36 (1981). "[B]oycotts are not a unitary phenomenon." St. Paul Fire and Ins.
Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978) (quoting P. AREEDA, ANITRUST ANALYsIs 381
(2d ed. 1974). The Supreme Court has noted that its own "decisions reflect a
marked lack of uniformity in defining the term." St. Paul Fire and Ins. Co. v.
Barry, 438 U.S. at 543. "[T]he simple use of labels cannot suffice .... " Ron Ton-
kin Turisino, Inc. v. Fiat Distributors, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 63,854, at
78,529 (9th Cir. 1981).
51. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49-50. See notes 60-
62 in(fra and accompanying text.
52. The Supreme Court has placed group boycotts into three categories:
(1) Horizontal combinations of competitors to exclude direct competitors
from the market. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 336 U.S.
1 (1945); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
(2) Vertical combinations to exclude competitors of some of the mem-
bers of the combination. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
(3) Combinations designed to influence the trade practices of boycott
victims rather than to eliminate them as competitors. See, e.g., Fash-
ion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
53. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
54. Id. at 468.
55. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). In Klors, the petitioner alleged that competing retail-
ers conspired with leading appliance manufacturers and agreed not to sell to him,
or to sell only at discriminatory prices and on unfavorable terms. The respondents
countered that the matter was a purely private quarrel which did not amount to a
"public wrong" proscribed by the Sherman Act.
610
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sion Justice Black stated, "group boycotts or concerted refusals
by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in
the forbidden category. They are not saved by allegations that
they were reasonable in the specific circumstances ..... ",56
The third case in the development of the per se application to
group boycotts, and perhaps the case of highest interest is Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange.5 7 In Silver, the New York Stock
Exchange ordered its members to remove direct telephone wire
connections to Silver's office. Silver was a non-member of the Ex-
change and could not effectively operate as a broker-dealer with-
out the phone connections. No hearing as to the reasons for the
disconnection was provided by the Exchange. The Court felt that
important business advantages were taken away from Silver by
the group action of the Exchange and its members. Justice Stew-
art stated, "[s]uch 'concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders. . . have long been held to be in the forbidden cate-
gory .... ,"58 Silver, and the cases which followed it, have pro-
vided a very narrow exception to the per se rule.5 9 To qualify for
this exception, one must meet three requirements. First, there
must be a legislative mandate for self-regulation, "or otherwise."
Second, the collective action must be intended to accomplish an
end consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, be rea-
sonably related to that goal, and be no more extensive than nec-
essary. Third, the association must provide procedural
safeguards which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and
which furnish a basis for judicial review.
There is one further consideration in determining whether the
per se label may be properly attached to collective actions. The
actions must be shown to be manifestly anticompetitive. 60 In de-
termining whether a concerted action is anticompetitive, the rele-
vant inquiry is "[W]hether the refusal to deal, manifested by a
56. Id. at 212 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958));
Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
57. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
58. Id. at 348.
59. See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Il. 1980); Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn.
1977); Denver Rockets v. All.Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (injunction reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401U.S. 1204 (1971)); Comment, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirm-
ative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 1486 (1966).
60. See note 51 supra.
combination or conspiracy is so anticompetitive, in purpose or ef-
fect, or both, as to be an unreasonable restraint of trade." 61 In ex-
amining the purpose or effect of a combination or conspiracy, the
courts have examined the trade practices to determine whether
they are arbitrary and overbroad, or whether they are reasonable
and promote the legitimate needs of the conspirators. 62
In the application of these principles to Herschel Walker's case,
it can be seen that he has a rather persuasive argument that the
four-or-five year rule is both arbitrary and overbroad. The rule
prevents all athletes who do not meet the eligibility requirements
from participating in the League without regard to whether the
individual is physically capable of competing in the League or
whether the player wishes to attend college.
Should Herschel Walker successfully argue that the per se label
should be attached to the four-or-five year rule, the NFL would be
in an awkward position. The League would be faced with the
unenviable task of showing that the boycott qualified for the Sil-
ver exception to the per se rule. Failure to do so could lead to the
downfall of the rule. On the other hand, should the League pre-
vail in the argument that the four-or-five year rule does not con-
stitute a group boycott, or that the rule is not manifestly
anticompetitive, then the rule of reason would be the proper stan-
dard to determine the propriety of the NFL's rule.63 Before pro-
ceeding further with this line of analysis, it will be necessary to
61. Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979) (em-
phasis added). Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620,
626 (9th Cir. 1977), Alpha Distrib. Co. of Cal., Inc. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d
442, 452 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974).
62. Cases which have found practices by professional sports leagues to be ar-
bitrary and unreasonable include: Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp.
1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (athlete must be 20 years old to compete in the League); Bla-
lock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (probation
and fine for cheating was imposed in exercise of defendants unfettered discretion,
followed by a suspension without a hearing); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Manage-
ment, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (injunction reinstated sub nom. Hay-
wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (athlete not eligible to
compete until four years after graduation from high school). Cases which have
found practices by professional sports leagues to be reasonable and not anticom-
petitive include: Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979)
(prohibition preventing one-eyed hockey players from participating in the league
was to promote safety and was not motivated by an anticompetitive purpose);
Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 846 (1966) (requirement that a golfer participate in "test rounds" to demon-
strate she has the skills to compete in tournaments promotes competition by facil-
itating participation by proficient younger players); Molinas v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (suspension of an athlete involved in gam-
bling on the "point spread" of his team was necessary to insure the survival of the
League).
63. For a more detailed analysis of which standard should be applied, see
notes 135-47 infra and accompanying text.
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examine the application of antitrust law in cases dealing with pro-
fessional athletes. This is due to the fact that certain aberrations
have developed in this area of the law.
C. Antitrust Laws in Professional Athletics
1. The Baseball Anomaly
The first attempt to apply antitrust laws to professional sports
occurred in Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National
League of Professional Base Ball Clubs.64 The result was some-
what surprising. The Supreme Court found that baseball was not
involved in interstate commerce and as such was exempt from an-
titrust laws. The antitrust exemption for baseball has been up-
held in a number of cases including Toolson v. New York
Yankees 65 and Flood v. Kuhn.66 This exemption, controversial as
it may be, still exists today.67
In Radovich v. National Football League,68 the NFL argued for
a similar exemption, asserting that "football has just about the
same aspects as baseball" and that stare decisis compels a similar
exclusion from antitrust laws for footbaU.69 This contention fell
upon deaf ears and the Court ruled that football was subject to
antitrust laws. Other sports have also suffered a similar fate.70
64. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
65. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
66. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
67. For a more detailed analysis of this exemption, see L. SOBEL., supra note
12, at 1-82; Comment, Nearly a Century in Reserve: Organized Baseball: Collective
Bargaining and the Antitrust Exemption Enter the 80's, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313
(1981).
68. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
69. Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957).
70. The following cases have expressly or impliedly held that the antitrust ex-
emption is limited to baseball: Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S.
1204 (1971) (basketball); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236
(1955) (boxing); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966)
(golf); Washington St. Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d
371 (9th Cir. 1966) (bowling); National Wrestling Alliance v. Myers, 325 F.2d 768
(8th Cir. 1963) (wrestling); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n,
487 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. 111. 1980) (horse racing); Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n,
439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (hockey); Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc.,
410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (tennis); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (auto racing).
2. The Case Law
Prior to 1971, baseball was the only sport which selected or
drafted players directly out of high school.71 Subsequent to that
time the courts have determined that rules similar to the NFL's
four-or-five year rule constitute group boycotts and as such are
per se illegal. Linesman v. World Hockey Association7 2 was one
such decision. The Linesman case dealt with the World Hockey
Association's (WHA) rule which required a person to be twenty
years old before he was eligible to be drafted.7 3 Kenneth Lines-
man, a nineteen year old amateur Canadian hockey player, was
drafted by the Birmingham Bulls and entered into a $500,000 con-
tract with the team. The President of the League declared that
the contract violated the twenty-year-old rule, and was therefore
null and void. Linesman brought suit contending that the eligibil-
ity requirement constituted an unreasonable restraint in violation
of section one of the Sherman Act. The WHA defended the rule
on the ground that if Linesman was allowed to play, the League
would suffer a loss in excess of two and one half million dollars.7 4
The court, in granting a preliminary injunction, stated that the
twenty-year-old rule constituted a group boycott and was per se
illegal under the Sherman Act. The court then refused to grant
the Silver exception to the per se rule, stating that "it is doubtful
that the WHA would be able to demonstrate that even one of
these three prerequisites exists in the instant case."75
In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,76 Spencer Hay-
wood challenged the National Basketball League's four year rule
that prevented an athlete from participating in the league until
four years after he graduated from high school.77 Spencer Hay-
wood was drafted by the American Basketball Association's
71. Demoff, Eligibility Requirements for Young Athletes, Los ANGELES LAW-
YER, June 1981, at 35, 37.
72. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
73. The WHA's twenty-year-old rule provided: "Each member club shall make
its selections from among the players who attain their twentieth (20th) birthdays
between January 1st, next preceding the conduct of the draft, and December 31st,
next following the conduct of the draft both dates included." Id. at 1318 n.3.
74. It was alleged that this loss would result because the WHA had scheduled
hockey games in Canada between themselves and teams from Russia, Czechoslo-
vakia, Sweden, and Finland. Approval by the Canadian Amateur Hockey Ass'n
was required for these matches. The Canadian Association had indicated that
they would not sanction the contests if the twenty-year-old rule was violated.
75. Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. at 1321. It is doubtful that
the court's blanket statement is entirely correct because a number of decisions
have stated that organizations similar to the WHA qualify for the self-regulation
portion of the Silver exception. See notes 81-82 infra.
76. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) injunction reinstated sub nom. Haywood
v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)).
77. The National Basketball Association's four year rule, like the National
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(ABA) Denver Rockets following his sophomore year in college.
While the ABA had a four year rule similar to the one in the
NBA, Haywood was eligible to be drafted under a "hardship ex-
emption" to this rule.7 8 Spencer Haywood entered the ABA with
credentials as impressive as those of Herschel Walker. He was
honored with All-American status in both high school and college.
In the 1968 Olympics he led the United States' basketball team to
a gold medal and was named the outstanding player in the games.
In his first year with the Rockets he was named "Rookie of the
Year" and "Most Valuable Player in the ABA. ' 79 Despite this
success, he became disenchanted with the Rockets over a con-
tractual dispute and began to look for another team. Eventually
he signed a contract to play for the Seattle Supersonics of the
Football League's four-or-five year rule is in two parts. Section 2.05 of the By-Laws
of the NBA provides:
High School Graduate, etc. A person who has not completed high school
or who has completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four years after he has been
graduated or four years after his original high school class has been grad-
uated, as the case may be, nor may the future services of any such person
be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise reserved. Similarly a person
who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall not be eligible to
be drafted or to be a Player until the time when he would have first be-
come eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any negotiations or
agreements with any such person during such period shall be null and
void and shall confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member violating
the provisions of this paragraph be permitted to acquire the rights to the
services of such person at any time thereafter.
Section 6.03 provides:
Persons Eligible for Draft. The following classes of persons shall be eligi-
ble for the annual draft:
(a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be graduated
during the June following the holding of the draft;
(b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already
been graduated, and who do not choose to exercise remaining collegiate
basketball eligibility;
(c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already
been graduated if such students have no remaining collegiate basketball
eligibility;
(d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of Section
2.05 of these By-Laws. (emphasis in original).
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. at 1059.
78. Haywood qualified as a "hardship case" because he supported his mother
and nine younger brothers and sisters. Who Owns Haywood?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15,
1971, at 79. It is interesting to note that the ABA's "hardship exemption" was a
gimmick, devised to beat the NBA in signing Haywood. The ABA knew that no
NBA team could sign Haywood until after his senior year of college. L. SOBEL,
supra note 12, at 448-49, 468-69. By drafting Haywood prior to the time an NBA
team could, the Rockets could also avoid a bidding war with NBA teams.
79. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. at 1052.
NBA. The Commissioner of the NBA disapproved the contract
since it had not been four years since Haywood graduated from
high school. The stage was now set for the bitterly contested suit
which was to follow.
Spencer Haywood fied suit alleging that the NBA's four year
rule constituted a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act.
Haywood then fied a motion for partial summary judgment seek-
ing an order declaring two sections of the NBA By-Laws to be ille-
gal under section one of the Sherman Act.s0 Judge Ferguson
granted the motion.
In reaching this decision, Judge Ferguson conducted a detailed
analysis of the Silver exception to the per se rule. He noted that
the "or otherwise" language in the mandate for self-regulation re-
quirement had been extended to situations wherein the structure
of the industry requires collective action.81 Surely there could be
no argument that the NBA should be entitled to develop rules
which are reasonably necessary to ensure the perpetuation of the
League.82
Under the second prong of the Silver test, the NBA put forth
three contentions supporting the four year rule. First, the NBA
suggested that the rule was financially necessary to professional
basketball as a business enterprise. This argument was rejected
on the grounds that Klor's did not provide for an exemption for
such a reason. Second, the NBA argued that the rule was neces-
sary to guarantee that a basketball player should be given an op-
portunity to complete four years of college before playing for a
professional team. In noting that this was indeed a commendable
goal, Judge Ferguson stated that "[TI his court is not in a position
to say that this consideration should override the objective of fos-
tering economic competition.... If such a determination is to be
made, it must be made by Congress and not the courts."8 3 This
was also found to be more restrictive than necessary because the
rules in question prohibited the signing of all college basketball
players, including those who did not want to attend college, as
80. See note 77 supra.
81. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65. See
also note 59 supra.
82. See Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (stan-
dards which promote safety); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d
646 (5th Cir. 1977) (in some sporting enterprises a few rules are essential to sur-
vival); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966)
(golf eligibility determined by "test rounds" did not violate antitrust laws); Gunter
Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb. 1981)
(need for collective action is inherent in organized sports); Molinas v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (suspension of a basketball
player for wagering on the "point spread" of his team's games).
83. Denver Rockets v. All.Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
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well as those who did not have the financial or mental ability to
do so.
Third, the NBA contended that collegiate athletics provide a
less expensive way of training athletes than the "farm team" sys-
tem used in baseball. The court flatly rejected this argument,
stating that even if it was true, it could not provide a basis for an
antitrust exemption.
The court also considered the procedural due process require-
ment of Silver, and concluded that the NBA dismally failed to
meet the requisites of this requirement.84 In the words of Judge
Ferguson:
It is clear from the constitution and by-laws of the NBA that there is no
provision for even the most rudimentary hearing before the four-year col-
lege rule is applied to exclude an individual player. Nor is there any pro-
vision whereby an individual player might petition for certain
consideration of his specific case. Due to the lack of any such provisions,
this court must conclude that on the basis of the undisputed facts, the
NBA rules in question fall outside the Silver exception and are subject to
the per se rule normally applicable to group boycotts.8 5
In summary, it would appear that the law favors Herschel
Walker should he choose to challenge the NFL's four-or-five year
rule. The Haywood case paints a rosy picture for Herschel in
the outcome of a lawsuit. Under Haywood it appears that Her-
schel could receive a preliminary injunction allowing him to par-
ticipate in the NFL. However, at this point some distinctions
between the two cases should be delineated. First, Spencer Hay-
wood had clearly shown that he could compete in professional
athletics, something that Herschel has not yet accomplished.86
Second, as will be seen, the NFL has set forth justifications for its
rule which were not dealt with in the Haywood case. With this in
mind, we can now turn to Herschel's challenge of the NFL's four-
or-five year rule.
84. It might be noted that the procedural due process requirement of Silver is
not limited to a provision for a hearing. In Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n,
358 2d F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966), where a golfer had
the opportunity to play in "test rounds" to prove she was qualified for tournament
play, the Silver procedural due process requirements were met.
85. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. at 1066 (empha-
sis in original).
86. For this reason it is highly unlikely that Herschel Walker would be entitled
to any damages in a lawsuit challenging the four-or-five year rule. See notes 23-25
supra and accompanying text.
IV. WALKER v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
A. Will the National Football League Defend the Four-or-Five
Year Rule?
Should Herschel Walker bring suit against the NFL, one can be
relatively certain that the League would defend the four-or-five
year rule vehemently. Commissioner Rozelle, in reaction to the
Haywood basketball decision, stated, "[I]t would no doubt de-
stroy college football and basketball."87 Rozelle also announced
that despite the Haywood decision, the NFL would continue to
enforce its rule.88 The likelihood that the League would challenge
this suit rests on more fundamental considerations. Since col-
legiate players largely represent the sole source of athletes for
the NFL, the League must establish a working relationship with
colleges for the draft to be successful.8 9 Professional teams have
been known to wine and dine college coaches and often provide
them with tickets to their games.90 Professional scouts often visit
college campuses to speak with college coaches concerning a po-
tential draftee's athletic abilities, coachability, motivation, and
maturity.9 1
College teams are also highly supportive of the four-or-five year
rule.92 The reason for this is simple. Collegiate football programs
often rely heavily upon one or two athletes for their success. 93 A
rule such as the NFL's ensures that these athletes will remain in
the college program. 94 Should the NFL fail to defend a lawsuit
challenging the four-or-five year rule, collegiate teams could be
somewhat less than receptive in dealing with professional scouts.
This would severely damage the symbiotic relationship that has
developed between professional and collegiate teams.
87. Johnson, A License to Steal the Stars, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 12, 1971, at
35, 35.
88. L. SOBEL, supra note 12, at 465-66 (1977).
89. S. GALLNER, supra note 21, at 4 (1974).
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Claude Felton, Sports Information Director for the University of Georgia
stated that the University "obviously supports the NFL rule since it was designed
for 'the good of the whole.'" Letter from Claude Felton to author (Oct. 1, 1981).
93. L. SOBEL, supra note 12, at 419.
94. On the other hand, abolition of the four-or-five year rule would appeal to
those who feel that the function of a university is to educate and not to serve as a
"farm system" for professional sports leagues. In response to the Haywood deci-
sion, one conference commissioner remarked, "We could always go back to using
student athletes." Johnson, supra note 87, at 35.
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B. The Lawsuit
1. National Football League's Defenses
a. Joint Venture
Should Herschel Walker fie a complaint against the NFL, the
league could be expected to raise any number of defenses. One
such defense would be that the League is operating as a joint ven-
ture,95 and as such does not come under the purview of the Sher-
man Act.9 6 The National Hockey League and the National
Basketball Association have successfully argued for this exemp-
tion.9 7 The NFL has also argued for this exemption, but with lim-
ited success. In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,98 the court noted that
"the clubs operate basically as a joint venture. . . ."99 but then
applying the rule of reason, the court found that the NFL draft as
it existed in 1968 constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in
contravention of the Sherman Act. In North American Soccer
League v. National Football League,1 00 the NFL successfully ar-
gued that the acts of the League were those of a single economic
entity and as such fell outside the boundaries of the Sherman
Act. The apparent inconsistency in the application of joint ven-
ture cases was explained by Judge Haight in the North American
Soccer Case. He stated:
If member teams of a professional sports league compete with each other
in an identifiable market, § 1 of the Sherman Act applies; the legality of
restraints on such competition is judged by the rule of reason .... Thus
95. A joint venture is a joint business undertaking of two or more parties who
share the risks as well as the profits of the business. Los Angeles Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp. 154, 162-63 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
Technically the NFL is not a joint venture because they do not share in profits and
losses. Id. at 163 n.9; North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
96. The dominant purpose of § 1 of the Sherman Act is to maintain competi-
tion among independent business firms. If the NFL could successfully argue that
their teams are not independent firms which engage in economic competition but
rather joint venturers, the NFL would be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.
Los Angeles Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp. at 162.
97. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 970
(C.D. Cal. 1974); Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 150 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Neither of those cases dealt with restraints imposed on the individual
teams in acquiring players.
98. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
99. Id. at 1179. The joint venture characteristics of. the NFL have also been
noted in Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) and
North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
100. 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
the single economic entity fails in the player contract restriction cases,
where all member teams compete with each other for players, and league
restraint of that competition damages the players. . . .But if joint league
conduct neither implicates nor impinges upon competition between the
member clubs, then the ... league ... may be properly regarded as a sin-
gle economic entity. 10 1
In the case of the four-or-five year rule, the identifiable market
is that of college football players. NFL teams clearly compete
amongst themselves for these players. One only need look to the
fact that draft choices are frequently "traded" to find support for
this statement.102 Herschel Walker is harmed by the NFL rule,
because he is unable to compete in the League. As a result, a
court arguably should not grant the NFL an exemption from anti-
trust laws under a joint venture theory.
Should the court grant the NFL the label of joint venture, how-
ever, this would not spell the end to Herschel's action. In Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,103 the defendant companies
defended territorial division of world markets for antifriction
bearings on the ground that they operated as a joint venture. The
Court rejected this characterization, stating, "[nior do we find
any support ... for the proposition that agreements between le-
gally separate . . . companies to suppress competition among
themselves and others can be justified by labeling the project as a
'joint venture.' 104 Since NFL teams are legally separate compa-
nies, it would appear that even if they were granted joint venture
status, they could not agree amongst themselves to suppress com-
petition for collegiate players.
b. The Labor Exemption: Fourth and Goal
Labor organizations have been granted a limited exemption
from antitrust laws under the Clayton Act' 05 and the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.106 While this statutory exemption only applies to ac-
tions unilaterally taken by labor organizations, 107 the Supreme
Court has created a non-statutory exemption from antitrust laws
for collective bargaining agreements between management and
labor. This exemption applies even if the agreement, standing
alone, would violate antitrust law.10 8
101. Id. at 677.
102. In 1976, the Dallas Cowboys acquired Seattle's first-round draft choice via
a trade and drafted Tony Dorsett.
103. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
104. Id. at 598.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (1976).
107. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
108. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfltters, 427 U.S. 616 (1975). The
non-statutory exemption is derived from a strong labor policy favoring the associa-
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With the exception of Flood v. Kuhn109 the labor exemption
was not brought before the courts in cases involving professional
sports leagues until players began to challenge the player reserve
systems.110 The NFL has had occasion to argue for a labor ex-
emption on three separate occasions, and in none of the cases
was it granted.
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,"' a suit was filed against the
League alleging that the 1968 draft constituted a group boycott in
violation of the antitrust laws. Smith argued that because he
could only bargain with the team that drafted him, he was unable
to negotiate a contract reflecting the true value of his services or
one that would adequately protect him from loss of earnings in
the event of injury.112 The NFL's argument for a collective bar-
gaining exemption failed because the pact was not signed by the
players' union until after the 1968 draft.113
In Kapp v. National Football League,114 the NFL's labor ex-
emption argument was again tackled on a technicality. Kapp
signed a contract to play for the Boston Patriots on October 6,
1970 and played the last eleven games of the season. This con-
tract was not the NFL Standard Players Contract which provided,
in part, that the player agreed to abide by the NFL Constitution
and By-Laws. When Kapp refused to sign the Standard Players
Contract, he was told to leave the team. During the suit, the NFL
tion of employees in order to eliminate competition over wages and working condi-
tions. Id. at 622. Some commentators have argued that the labor exemption,
combined with collective bargaining agreement between players associations and
professional sports leagues, make it highly unlikely an antitrust suit against the
League will prevail. See Jacobs and Winter, Jr., Anti-trust Principles and Collec-
tive Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
109. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated that
the limits to the antitrust violations to which labor and management can agree
should be explored.
110. Reserve systems typically provided that, after a player had fulfilled his
contract, he became a free agent who could sign with another team if the other
team paid compensation to his former team. See McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,649 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
111. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), affid in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
112. Smith suffered a serious neck injury in the final game of the 1968 season,
and his career as a football player was terminated.
113. On appeal, the NFL did not appeal the lower court's ruling that the League
did not qualify for the labor exemption. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1177
n.11.
114. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affid on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978).
argued for a labor exemption, stating that the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement between the League and the players' union, that
required all players to sign the Standard Players Contract, had
been accepted by Kapp through the Players Association. While
the bargaining agreement was signed June 17, 1971, it was retroac-
tive to February 1, 1970. The League contended that Kapp's Octo-
ber 6, agreement was included in this period. The court refused
to allow an exemption because Kapp was informed that he was
required to sign the Standard Players Contract pursuant to the
League's Constitution and By-Laws. The court found that the
League could not now assert that the Collective Bargaining
Agreement retroactively justified the ouster of Kapp.
The third case in which the NFL argued for the labor exemption
was Mackey v. National Football LeagueX15 a suit which chal-
lenged the validity of the so-called Rozelle Rule.116 In refusing to
grant an exemption, the court set forth a three-part test to qualify
for a labor exemption. First, the restraint of trade must affect
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second,
the agreement sought to be exempted must involve a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining.11 7 Third, the agreement sought to
be exempted must be the product of bona fide arm's-length bar-
gaining. The court found the first test was readily met since the
Rozelle Rule affected only the parties to the agreements sought to
be exempted. The court also found that the agreement was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining in that the Rozelle
Rule restricted players' salaries. The labor exemption was disal-
lowed for failure to meet the bargaining requirement. The circuit
court affirmed the district court finding that "the parties' collec-
tive bargaining history reflected nothing which could be legiti-
mately characterized as bargaining over the Rozelle Rule. 1' 3
In analyzing the case law which deals with the NFL's claim to a
115. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
116. The Rozelle or "Ransom" Rule provided that when a free agent left his for-
mer team and signed with another team, the former team was entitled to compen-
sation. Rozelle, at his discretion, could award the former club one or more players
from the acquiring club.
117. To constitute a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the agreement
must involve wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Not all
jurisdictions would agree with this requirement. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. South-
western Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,184 (3d
Cir. 1978) (labor exemption granted where there was no collective bargahing
agreement).
118. Mackey v. National Football League, 843 F.2d at 615. Lack of bargaining
was found because the Players' Association was in a relatively weak bargaining
position vis-a-vis the clubs. Consequently, the Rozelle Rule, which did not benefit
the players, had gone unchallenged by the players from the time it was unilater-
ally promulgated by the League in 1963.
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labor exemption, it is rather clear that the courts have not favored
granting the League exemption from the antitrust laws. They
have found that the exemption does not apply where there are
mere technical deficiencies in the requirements for a nonstatutory
exemption. In summary, should the League argue for a labor ex-
emption in a case challenging the four-or-five year rule, a court
would carefully scrutinize this claim to determine its validity.
In applying the Mackey test for a labor exemption to this case,
one need only examine the first requirement to see that the claim
is in serious trouble. Herschel Walker is not a party to the collec-
tive bargaining relationship. He is a collegiate football player
whose interests are not represented at the bargaining table. This
is especially significant in light of the Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers and Steamfittersnl9 decision, wherein a local union
made agreements with several contractors that nonunion subcon-
tractors would be ineligible to compete for a portion of the avail-
able work. Connell, a general contractor, signed an agreement,
under protest, with Local 100 not to employ nonunion subcontrac-
tors. Connell then brought suit under sections one and two of the
Sherman Act seeking a declaration that the agreement was inva-
lid. The Court rejected Local 100's argument for the nonstatutory
exemption. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, stated
"tlhere can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in
other contexts, that a restraint of this magnitude might be enti-
tled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful bar-
gaining agreement .... In this case, Local 100 had no interest in
representing Connell's employees." 120 Such is the case here. The
NFL Players Association has no interest in representing col-
legiate football players.12 1
119. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
120. Id. at 625-26. Cf. Allan Bradley v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1974),
where local contractors agreed to purchase equipment from manufacturers who
had a closed shop agreement with the union. The Court did not find immunity
from antitrust laws reasoning: "If business groups, by combining with labor un-
ions can fix prices and divide up markets it was little more than a futile gesture for
Congress to prohibit price fixing by business groups themselves." Id. at 809-10.
Cf. United States v. Woman's Sportsware Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) ("benefits to
organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's paw to pull the employers chestnuts
out of the fire." Id. at 464); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)
(an agreement which results from union-employer bargaining is not exempt from
the Sherman Act simply because the negotiations covered any compulsory subject
of bargaining).
121. This is especially significant in this case because an incoming collegiate
The NFL's claim for a labor exemption would be damaged even
further when one notes that the four-or-five year rule is not in-
cluded in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Play-
ers Association and the NFL.122 The NFL could attempt to avoid
this technicality by waiting for Herschel to sign a Standard Play-
ers Contract with the provision that the player agrees to abide by
the NFL Constitution and By-Laws and then declare the contract
void. 23 The validity of such a practice seems to have been ques-
tioned in the Kapp Case. While the Kapp court did not grant a
labor exemption due to a technicality, it did give some insight into
how the labor exemption should be treated in this context. It
asked the question posed by Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion in the Flood case as to what "are the limits to the anti-
trust violations to which labor and management can agree?"124
The Kapp court then answered its question:
(The] exemption does not and should not go so far as to permit immu-
nized combinations to enforce employer-employee agreements which, be-
ing unreasonable restrictions on an employee's right to freely seek and
choose his employment, have been held illegal on grounds of public policy
long before and entirely apart from antitrust laws.125
It does not seem likely that the NFL would be able to score with
its argument for a labor exemption. It has created a system
which unreasonably restrains a collegiate football player's right to
freely seek and choose his employment. In so doing, the NFL has
football player would be competing with the members of the Players Association
for positions on a football team. See also note 122 supra.
122. In light of the Connell decision, it is doubtful whether the four-or-five year
rule would be enforceable even if it were included in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. It would also be difficult to prove such an agreement actually was "bar-
gained for" due to the mutual interests of the Players Association and the NFL in
preventing undergraduates from entering the League. Members of the Players As-
sociation would agree to the rule to protect their jobs. The NFL on the other
hand, would want to do nothing to damage their cozy relationship with college
teams. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text.
123. The Collective Bargaining Agreement requires every player to sign the
Standard Players Contract. NAT'L FooTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERs ASS'N AND NAT'L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT CoUNcm, CoLLEcTVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
art. XHI, § 1 (1977). The Collective Bargaining Agreement also provides that provi-
sions of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, which are not superseded by the
agreement, remain in full force and effect. Id. art. I, § 2. Because § 14 of the Stan-
dard Players Contract provides that the player agrees to abide by the rules and
procedures of the League, when a player signs the contract he is bound by the
NFL Constitution and By-Laws. This would include the four-or-five year rule be-
cause it is not a subject of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Commissioner
Rozelle may dispose of contracts between a player and a club executed in viola-
tion of or contrary to the NFL Constitution and By-Laws. NAT'L FooTBALL LEAGUE
CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE NAT'L FooTBALL LEAGUE art. viii § 8.14(a) (1976).
124. Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affld
on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 86.
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also failed to meet the requirements for the exemption from anti-
trust laws.
2. Standing to Sue Under the Sherman Act
Before a concerted refusal to deal may be condemned as illegal
under the Sherman Act, two threshold elements must be present.
First, there must be some impact on "trade or commerce among
the several states."' 26 Second, there must be sufficient agreement
to constitute a "contract, combination,.., or conspiracy." 27 The
issue of whether the NFL is involved in trade or commerce was
settled in Radovich v. National Football League,128 where the
Supreme Court found that the League conducted business on a
multistate basis and conducted interstate transmission of games
on radio and television. Currently the NFL has twenty eight
teams operating in major cities throughout the United States.
The existence of a contract or conspiracy is equally easy to show.
The member teams of the League have subscribed to the NFL
Constitution and By-Laws. In so doing they have agreed not to
deal with football players who do not meet the eligibility require-
ments of the four-or-five year rule.
For an individual to have standing to bring an action for viola-
tion of the antitrust laws, he must show that he was injured by
the anticompetitive actions of the conspirators. The courts have
developed a number of "standing tests" which are not unlike the
notion of "proximate cause" in tort law. Generally, the tests may
be grouped in two broad categories. The more restrictive test fo-
cuses on the "directness of the injury." The more liberal and
more widely accepted test, focuses upon whether the plaintiff is
within the "target area" of the defendant's violation. 29 The "di-
rect injury" test was first introduced in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak
Co.1 30 The "directness" requirement precludes standing where
injuries are regarded as "remote," "incidental," or "consequent-
ial" results of the defendant's antitrust violations.13' Herschel
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 14 supra.
127. Id.
128. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
129. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
130. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
131. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 133 F. 704 (3d
Cir. 1910); Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y.
Walker is directly injured by the NFL's primary boycott because
he is excluded from the market he wishes to enter. 32 Since Her-
schel Walker is directly injured by the four-or-five year rule, he
has standing to bring an antitrust action under the Sherman Act.
Under the less demanding "target area" test, a plaintiff must
show that he suffered "injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defend-
ants' acts unlawful." 133 Restated, the test requires the plaintiff to
show that he was within the area "which it could be reasonably
foreseen would be affected" by the conspiracy. 134 Since the NFL's
four-or-five year rule is directed toward collegiate athletes who
have not fulfilled the eligibility requirements and since Herschel
is one such athlete, it may reasonably be foreseen that Herschel
will be affected by the NFL's conspiracy. Consequently Herschel
Walker has standing to sue under the "target area" test.
3. Rule of Reason or Per Se?
Having determined that the Sherman Act would apply to
Walker's action, the focus now shifts to whether to apply the rule
of reason or a per se approach. The typical approach to a group
boycott which is arguably motivated by anticompetitive desires,
or where no provision for a hearing is made in challenging the
regulation, is to apply the per se label unless the Silver exception
is applicable. 35 This approach has been applied in a number of
decisions dealing with player restrictions imposed by professional
sports leagues. 13 6
1967); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Snow
Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
132. Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. at 1321; Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. at 1061. Two other harms result from the
four-or-five year rule. First, competition in the market in which Herschel attempts
to sell his services is injured. Second, by pooling their economic power, the indi-
vidual members of the NFL have, in effect, established their own private govern-
ment. Id.
133. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
134. Mulveny v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1970); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Gold-
wyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
135. Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 430 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
136. Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Bow-
man v. National Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975) (while "per se"
did not appear in the opinion, it is evident that this approach was used because
Judge Devitt cited only cases which were decided under the per se doctrine); Rob-
ertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Blalock v. La-
dies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (distinguished from
Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) because Deesen
was not totally excluded from the market and the Association provided a "test
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The courts, however, appear to be split as to whether to apply a
Silver type per se analysis or a rule of reason analysis to collec-
tive restraints imposed by organized sports leagues. It appears
that the NFL has been reasonably successful in avoiding applica-
tion of a per se standard to its collective actions. 3 7 These law-
suits, however, have involved athletes who are currently playing,
or have been playing in the League. In Bowman v. National Foot-
ball League,138 a case which did not involve players in the NFL,
the League passed a resolution preventing players from the de-
funct World Football League from signing contracts with NFL
teams until the end of the season. The court enjoined the boycott,
finding it illegal per se.139 Further, in the Haywood and Linesman
cases, which involved rules similar to the NFL's, courts found
these restrictions to be illegal per se. In light of this, it appears
that the courts would apply a Silver analysis to a lawsuit chal-
lenging the four-or-five year rule.
On the other hand, liberal application of the per se rule has
been heavily criticized by a number of authorities, and perhaps
with good reason. Julian 0. von Kalinowski is among those who
have roundly criticized the courts expansion of the per se doc-
trine. He argues, "[wie have entered an era of rigid antitrust pol-
icy where 'absolutes' have become king and the rule of reason
exiled into a philosophy of the past."1 40 In the area of group boy-
cotts, courts are dangerously close to completing the circle and re-
turning to the per se standard of medieval times. Then, as now,
an all-inclusive prohibition against restraints seriously impinges
upon everyday business transactions. Mr. von Kalinowski argues
that there is a need to return to the standard of reason and con-
sider "the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied."'41 Indeed, it may well be time to heed Cardozo's warn-
round" to determine Deesen's qualifications to compete in the League); Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
137. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Kapp v. National Football
League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affid on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978).
138. 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975).
139. Id.
140. von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust
Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569, 591 (1964).
141. Id. (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)). The per se concept does have a place in such a philosophy if limited to
practices which have the purpose and effect of stifling competition. Id.
ing to beware "the tyranny of tags and tickets."142
Proponents of the idea that the per se test should not be ap-
plied to sports leagues are quick to point out that the player draft
does not fall within the traditional mold of the group boycott. 143
They argue that member teams of the League are not competitors
in the economic sense. It is further argued that the NFL teams do
not combine to protect themselves from non-group members who
seek to compete with the NFL clubs. This reasoning was ac-
cepted by the court in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 144 In light of
this, there is a highly persuasive argument that the rule of reason
should be applied to the NFL's eligibility requirement. Commen-
tators who argue for a rule of reason analysis for cases such as
Walker's cite the approach suggested by Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States.14 5 Justice
Brennan proposed a three-part test to determine the reasonable-
ness of the challenged restraints. First, are they reasonably re-
lated to the needs which brought them into being? Second, is the
restraint so justified more restrictive than necessary, or exces-
sively anticompetitive when viewed in light of the extenuating cir-
cumstances? Third, are less restrictive alternatives available?146
One commentator has argued that Brennan's approach was in
fact applied in the Haywood case.147 Due to the factors which in-
dicate that the per se analysis may not be appropriate in dealing
with the organized sports, both approaches should be analyzed.
The distinction between the two tests is largely academic as these
divergent paths will lead in most cases to the same destination. 4 8
142. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REV. 682, 688 (1931). Given Presi:
dent Reagan's favorable disposition towards "big business," one can foresee a shift
away from emphasis on the per se rule.
143. See note 48 supra.
144. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.D.C. 1978) (applying the rule of reason, however, the court
found that the draft, as it existed in 1968, constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade).
145. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). While White Motor dealt with territorial restrictions
imposed by manufacturers, application of the Brennan approach to competitive
abuses throughout organized sports was suggested in Rivkin, Sports Leagues and
Antitrust Laws, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINEss 387, 410 (R. Noll ed.
1974).
146. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. at 270-71. This is essentially the
same test as the second requirement of Silver. See note 59 supra and accompany-
ing text.
147. Rivkin, supra note 145, at 387, 401. If one carefully scrutinizes the Hay-
wood case, however, it is evident that Judge Ferguson applied a Silver analysis.
See notes 76-85 supra and accompanying text.
148. Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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4. The Silver Analysis
a. The Self Regulation Requirement
Under the Silver test, for the four-or-five year rule to qualify for
an exemption from a per se standard, the League must first show
that there is a legislative mandate for self-regulation, or other-
wise. There is no legislative mandate for self-regulation in regard
to the NFL. As such they will have to qualify for the "or other-
wise" requirement. This has readily been granted to professional
sports leagues as the structure of the industry requires collective
action.149 In Kapp, the League was quick to point out that the
need for self-regulation has been noted by Congress'50 and the
Department of Justice.15l One can be relatively certain that the
NFL has been granted the right to self-regulation.
The League must now show that the collective action is in-
tended to accomplish an end consistent with the policy justifying
self-regulation: it is reasonably related to that goal, and is no
more restrictive than necessary. This League has asserted a
number of policies justifying enforcement of the four-or-five year
rule.15 2
149. See notes 59 and 82 supra and accompanying text.
150. Congressional action includes: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94 (exempting joint ar-
rangements for club television rights from antitrust laws); sponsorship of a bill by
Senator John F. Kennedy in 1958 which would have granted antitrust exemption
for all professional sports leagues, because as the Senator stated, the leagues are
so unique that they cannot be treated in the same manner as other businesses; 15
U.S.C. § 1291 (authorizing the merger of the American Football League with the
National Football League). Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. at 79
n.3.
151. In 1961, the Department of Justice acknowledged that professional league
teams must have some joint agreements to assure continued functioning of the
leagues. In 1971, the Department made a similar acknowledgement. Kapp v. Na-
tional Football League, 390 F. Supp. at 80 n.4.
152. The NFL appears to defend the rule as if it were their moral obligation to
the college players. Perhaps the real reason for the rule lies in the fact that the
rule serves the financial interests of both the colleges and the NFL. It serves the
colleges because, by granting athletic scholarships, they can protect their supply
of cheap labor. The NFL is served because the rule allows for the preservation of
the draft system. See Who Oum Haywood?, note 78 supra at 79. The draft system
allows the NFL to artificially suppress salaries paid to NFL players. Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1185-86; L. SOBEL, supra note 12, at 259. See also notes 89-
94 s-upra and accompanying text.
b. The Policies Justifying the Rule
1) A Congressional Mandate
First, the League asserts, "Congressional Committees have fre-
quently insisted that the NFL do nothing to interfere with the col-
lege game. Congress has even enacted laws preventing the NFL
from competing with college football game telecasts. The NFL
would prefer that it not be compelled to do so." 153 The statute the
League makes reference to is a provision included in Title 28
United States Code, Chapter 32. This provision provides that pro-
fessional football games may not be broadcast on Friday evenings
or on Saturdays if the telecasting station is located within sev-
enty-five miles of an intercollegiate or interscholastic football con-
test.154 One purpose of the bill is to prevent impairment of
college football gate receipts through network telecasts at times
when college games are normally played.155 A corollary purpose
for the bill is to provide greater protection for in-person attend-
ance at college football games.156 It seems difficult to justify an
antitrust exemption based on this statute since it only deals with
telecasting of football games. This inconsistency becomes more
obvious when one realizes that Chapter 32 also includes a provi-
sion that antitrust laws remained unaffected by this Chapter "ex-
cept the agreements to which section 1291 shall apply."'157
It is also likely that the impact upon the college game would be
minimal should the four-or-five year rule be abolished. Since the
NBA's four year rule was abolished ten years ago, relatively few
basketball players have opted to turn professional before com-
pleting their collegiate careers.158 Because college athletes may
still be growing physically,159 and the extensive training required
to compete in professional football, it is likely that even fewer
players will jump to the NFL before completing their college eligi-
bility.160 If the NFL has enacted the four-or-five year rule to pro-
153. Letter from Hamilton Carothers of Covington and Burling, to author (Sept.
25, 1981) (hereinafter cited as Covington and Burling).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1293 (1976).
155. H.R. REP. No. 1178, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); S. REP. No. 1087, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3042, 3042.
156. H.R. REP. No. 1178, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961); S. REP. No. 1087, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 3042, 3043-44.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976) (section 1291 removed the League's package sales of
television rights of its members from antitrust laws).
158. The number of college players involved in the NBA's hardship draft in the
decade following its enactment has averaged less than eight players per year.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 36.
159. According to Dr. Clarence Shields, team physician for the Los Angeles
Rams, an athlete reaches the peak of his physical capabilities at 22 years of age.
Letter from Dr. Clarence L. Shields to author (Nov. 5, 1981).
160. Demoff, supra note 71, at 41.
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mote the legislative policies underlying Title 15, United States
Code, section 1293, the rule does not reasonably relate to these
goals. The reason is that the impact of college football programs
would be insignificant if the rule is abolished.
2) College Athletic Programs as Farm Systems
The League also argues, "[p]rofessional football has no minor
league structure. Players who do not make NFL squads have lit-
tle opportunity to develop and sharpen their skills. Only an occa-
sional college player would be successful in making the leap. The
overwhelming majority would lose both ways." 16 1 In Haywood
and Linesman, the courts soundly rejected the notion that col-
leges could be substituted as a "farm system" or as a training
ground to develop and sharpen the skills of a league's prospective
players. The rule is also more restrictive than necessary. It pro-
vides a total bar to college players who have sufficiently devel-
oped and sharpened their skills to compete in the NFL.162
3) An Opportunity for an Education
The NFL's next contention is:
What the League has sought to avoid is a policy whereunder its clubs en-
gage in efforts to induce college players to abandon both their education
and their college careers for little more than a shot at making an NFL
squad.... The educational opportunities offered by college football
scholarships should not be dismissed lightly. Professional football rarely
makes possible more than a temporary career.163
Encouraging a college football player to complete his college
education is indeed a commendable goal. The simple truth, how-
ever, is that typically the NFL football player does not take advan-
tage of this opportunity. Less than one-half of all NFL players
have undergraduate degrees and only seven of the twenty-eight
first-round draft choices in 1979 have graduated from college as of
1980.164
Further, there may be some question as to whether the role of
collegiate institutions is to provide an education for athletes or to
161. Covington & Burling, supra note 153.
162. Gil Brandt, the highly respected director of player personnel for the Dallas
Cowboys, believes Herschel is capable of competing in the NFL. See note 9 supra.
Dr. Clarence Shields, team physician for the Los Angeles Rams, shares this opin-
ion. Letter from Dr. Clarence L. Shields to author (Nov. 5, 1981).
163. Covington & Burling, supra note 153.
164. Demoff, supra note 71, at 40.
prepare them for their professional careers. The recent decision
in Hall v. University of Minnesota165 addressed this issue. In
Hall, Mark Hall, a formidable basketball player, was enrolled in a
non-baccalaureate degree program at the University of Minnesota.
The program terminated when Hall accumulated ninety credits.
Unless he was granted admission into a "degree program" his eli-
gibility to play on the school's basketball team also terminated.
The University refused to grant Hall admission into the program.
Without an opportunity to play during the winter quarter of 1982,
Hall would be a sixth round choice in the National Basketball As-
sociation's draft. However, if he were allowed to play during this
time, he would be selected in the second round. Hall brought suit
to restore his athletic eligibility to preserve his chances for a "no
cut" professional basketball contract. Judge Lord found that the
school had deprived Hall of due process and granted him a pre-
liminary injunction ordering the University to admit him into a
degree-granting program. In so doing, Judge Lord made a number
of observations concerning the role of a university in the develop-
ment of an athlete. He felt that Mark Hall "[was a highly re-
cruited basketball player out of high school who was recruited to
come to the University of Minnesota to become a basketball
player and not a scholar."166 The court also accepted Hall's state-
ment that his underlying desire to be enrolled in a degree pro-
gram was to enhance his chances of becoming a professional
basketball player. Finally, Judge Lord stated:
The exceptionally talented student athlete is led to perceive the basket-
ball, football, and other athletic programs as farm teams and proving
grounds for professional sports leagues. It may well be true that a good
academic program for the athlete is made virtually impossible by the de-
mands of their sport at the college level. If this situation causes harm to
the University, it is because they fostered it .... 167
If the role of collegiate athletic programs is indeed that of prepar-
ing student athletes for their professional careers, when an ath-
lete has developed the skills necessary to compete at a
professional level, he should be given the opportunity to do so.
By mandating that an athlete remain at the college level unneces-
sarily exposes him to an injury that may extinguish his chances
in pursuing a professional career.
The Haywood court also dealt with the college education argu-
ment. The court felt that it was not in a position to rule that such
a consideration should override the objective of fostering eco-
nomic competition embodied in the antitrust laws, and deferred
165. 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982).
166. Id. at 106. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 109.
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the matter to the legislature. 68 The four-or-five year rule here, as
in Haywood, is overly broad. The rule operates as a complete bar
to college players who wish to compete in the NFL. It excludes
even those players who do not want to go to college as well as
those are are mentally or financially unable to do so. Less restric-
tive means are available and are actually provided by NFL teams.
NFL teams actively encourage their players to continue their col-
lege educations. The Miami Dolphins provide several scholar-
ships each year, and often agree to give their players additional
benefits if they complete their degree.169 The New England Patri-
ots have been known to pay for graduate education17 0 A note of
caution should be given to an athlete who elects to forego his col-
lege education "for a shot at making an NFL squad." He should
get his future team to agree to provide a "college fund in escrow
clause" in his contract to ensure he will receive an education in
the event he is unable to continue playing football. This would al-
leviate the possibility of him losing his opportunity to obtain an
education should he fail to "make it" in pro football.
4) Abolition of the Rule Will Not Benefit the Athlete
The NFL puts forth one more argument in support of the rule
preventing college players from signing with an NFL team until
he meets the eligibility requirements. "Few college players would
be advantaged by such efforts. Only an extraordinary college
football player could anticipate greater total professional career
earnings by such a process. College career performances are the
major determinant of initial contract rewards of the professional
player."'1T One of the criticisms of the NBA "hardship" draft
closely aligns with this argument. While the hardship draft may
help a superstar gain more rapid entry into the pros, it may also
hurt him as a player.'7 2 This is essentially what transpired when
168. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
169. The Miami Dolphins even provided a scholarship for Bob Griese's brother.
Inquiry Into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Pro-
fessional Sports, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1976) (testimony of Joseph Robbie).
170. Id. at 102 (testimony of William H. Sullivan) (it might be noted that this
player had not yet received his undergraduate degree).
171. Covington & Burling, supra note 153.
172. S. GALLNER, supra note 21, at 25. In the decade since the NBA's "hardship
draft" was enacted, considerably less than one-half of the players who left college
as undergraduates have had NBA careers of two or more seasons. Kirkpatrick,
Hello America We Came Back, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 1, 1980, at 34, 36.
David Brent signed a $1 million contract with an ABA team after
his sophomore year in college. The team later collapsed, and
when no other team wanted his services, his contract was worth-
less.17 3 Further, an athlete who has an extra year of experience
under his belt may be in a better bargaining position than if he
elects to enter the hardship draft. Consider the case of Howard
Porter, a Villanova All-American. He was offered a $350,000 con-
tract prior to his senior year, but was offered a $1.5 million con-
tract after his senior year.174 Despite this problem, the NBA
hardship draft continues. On the other hand, a number of ath-
letes have performed quite admirably after being selected in the
NBA's hardship draft. Following his sophomore year, when Isiah
Thomas led Indiana to a National Championship, he was selected
by the Detroit Pistons in the hardship draft. In his rookie year he
was chosen to play on the NBA All Star Team. Magic Johnson
has also established himself as one of the premier players in the
NBA. Other players who have distinguished themselves after be-
ing selected in the hardship draft include Cliff Robertson, Phil
Chenier, and Bob McAdoo. Should the athlete elect to remain in
college he obviously runs the risk of becoming seriously injured,
losing any opportunity he might have to experience the thrill of
competing in the NFL.175 In deciding whether to turn pro, the
athlete must balance the drawbacks of the hardship draft against
the possibility of injury should he remain in college. Since we op-
erate in a free enterprise system, the choice of turning pro or re-
maining in college should be that of the athlete.
The problem of compensation for the athlete has not posed any
problems in the National Basketball Association and there is no
reason to assume it would present difficulties in the NFL. The
collective bargaining agreement between the Players Association
and the NFL provides for minimum salaries for players in the
League.17 6 This could serve as a starting point for negotiations.
Of course it is also unlikely that any player who possesses only
those skills deserving of the minimum salary provided in the Bar-
gaining Agreement would jump to the NFL before completing his
collegiate eligibility. Such a player would remain in college to fur-
ther develop his skills. If a team is still unsure about the capabili-
ties of a football player, it is free to agree with the athlete that he
173. S. GALLNER, supra note 21, at 25.
174. Id. The duration of these contracts is not known.
175. In 1977, Tom Perry, a linebacker for the University of Colorado, was seri-
ously injured and forced to abandon his football career. It was felt that he would
have been selected in the first round of the upcoming draft.
176. The minimum salary for a rookie in the NFL is now $22,000 per year. NAT'L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS AssoCIATION AND NAT'L FooTBALL LEAGUE MANAGE-
MENT CouNcIL, COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXII, § 2 (1977).
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will be paid according to his performance during the course of the
season.
5) The Rule Promotes Safety
There are other arguments that the NFL will likely consider
raising. One concerns the safety considerations of an undergrad-
uate who has not yet fully matured physically,177 in competing
with older, more seasoned veterans. National Football League
players take their lives into their own hands each time they step
onto the football field. From 1969 to 1974 NFL players suffered an
estimated 5,110 injuries. 178 A 1974 survey of NFL team trainers re-
vealed an estimated record of 1,638 injuries, or twelve injuries for
every ten players. 179 Judge Matsch gave a rather accurate
description of pro football when he stated, "like coal mining and
railroading, professional football is hazardous to the health and
welfare of those who are employed as players." 180 Given the level
of physical violence in the League, the NFL has a rather powerful
argument that the four-or-five year rule is a virtual necessity to
prevent physical injury to young collegiate football players.
Case law would support a league's argument that it is legiti-
mately concerned for the welfare of players. In Neeld v. National
Hockey League,18 1 the National Hockey League (NHL) promul-
gated a rule preventing one-eyed hockey players from participat-
ing in the League. 8 2 Neeld, who only had one eye, brought suit
alleging violation of section one of the Sherman Act. He argued
that a "safety mask," which had especially been designed for him,
would adequately protect him from further injury. The court
found that the rule was not designed to have any anticompetitive
effect;183 rather it was implemented for the primary purpose of
promoting health and safety. The League also had a legitimate
177. See note 159 supra.
178. R. HORROW, SPORTS VIOLENCE 7 (1980).
179. Id. at 7-8.
180. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D. Colo. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1980) (evidence not limited to defendant's liability).
181. 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
182. The rule provides: "A player with only one eye, or one of whose eyes has a
vision of only three-sixtieths (3-60ths) or under, shall not be eligible to play for a
Member Club." Id. at 1298 n.1.
183. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 846 (1966).
concern to protect itself from being sued for personal injuries to
Neeld, or to others, if he was permitted to play.
Herschel Walker, however, can distinguish the Neeld case.
Neeld had an obvious physical defect which would cause legiti-
mate concern for his safety and well-being. The NHL developed a
definite standard which reflects a collegiate player's ability to
compete in professional hockey. As a result, the Neeld case is not
applicable.
For further support for the assertion that the NFL's four-or-five
year rule may not be justified for player safety reasons, one only
need return to the Linesman case. Hockey is equally as violent a
sport as football. In the National Hockey League's 1973-74 season,
8,000 stitches were required to mend players returning from the
battleground.184 The court, in striking down the WHA's twenty-
year-old rule, allowed a young man of nineteen years to partici-
pate in the League. At this age, most college players are fresh-
men or at best sophomores. If youngsters of this age are allowed
to compete in professional hockey, there is no good reason to pre-
vent college players from participation in professional football.185
6) The Rule does not Bar an Athlete from Participating in
Professional Football
The last argument the NFL might put forth in defense of the
four-or-five year rule would be that an athlete is not barred from
participating in professional football by the rule. The player has
other options available to him. He might compete in semi-pro
football, 86 or in the Canadian Football League, until he meets the
NFL's eligibility requirements. Case law has determined that
both of these alternatives are unsatisfactory. In Linesman, the
WHA argued that Linesman was not harmed by the League's
twenty-year-old rule since he was currently playing for the King-
ston Canadians in an amateur league. 187 The court rejected this
argument on three grounds. First, since the career of a profes-
sional athlete is very short, the loss of even one year of playing
time is very detrimental. Competing for the amateur team was
184. R. HoRRow, supra note 178, at 5.
185. Many "teenagers" have distinguished themselves while competing in the
professional ranks. Bobby Orr, Gordon Roberts, Darryl Dawkins, and Moses Ma-
lone are some of the more notable examples.
186. Football players who have opted for the "sandlot" route have returned to
the NFL and experienced successful careers. After Johnny Unitas was rejected by
the Pittsburgh Steelers, he played semi-pro football for the Bloomfield Rams for
six dollars a game. The following year he returned to the NFL and became one of
the greatest quarterbacks in the history of the League.
187. In Canada, amateur hockey players are paid and enter into contracts to
play for amateur teams.
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not seen as reducing the impact of the injury. Second, by playing
in a less competitive league the skills of the athlete are likely to
deteriorate. Third, by playing in the WHA, Linesman may
achieve "superstar status" which would bring him financial and
emotional awards not available if he were to compete for the
Kingston team. In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,18 8 the court found
that the alternative of playing in Canada was not satisfactory for
two reasons. First, opportunities for American players in Canada
are limited due to a hiring preference for Canadian players. Sec-
ond, the opportunities are significantly less rewarding as they
provide lower salaries, fewer promotional opportunities, and less
"glamor." This final argument, like its predecessors, is not likely
to be found as a persuasive reason supporting the League's four-
or-five year rule.
c. The Due Process Requirement
Silver also requires that the NFL provide sufficient procedural
due process to ensure that the restraint is not arbitrary and fur-
nishes a basis for judicial review. In response to this require-
ment, the NFL states that "[t]he League's rules are not entirely
rigid. Where special circumstances are established, the League
has been prepared to consider exceptions."189 In all due fairness
to the League, it appears that it has done so on at least one occa-
sion in the past.190 If one were to read the NFL's Constitution
and By-Laws, one would find no guarantee for even the most rudi-
mentary hearing before the four-or-five year rule is applied. In
fact, one would find a clause giving the Commissioner "the power,
without a hearing, to disapprove contracts between a player and
a club, if such a contract has been executed in violation of or con-
trary to the NFL Constitution and By-Laws of the League...."191
The lack of a provision for a hearing was found to constitute a per
se violation of the Sherman Act in the Haywood case. 192 Espe-
cially in light of the fact that the NFL expressly provides that no
hearing is required, there is no reason to assume this case would
188. 593 F.2d at 1185 n.48.
189. Covington & Burling, supra note 153.
190. See note 12 supra.
191. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE NAT'L FooTBALL
LEAGUE art.VHI § 8.14(A) (emphasis added).
192. See also Washington St. Bowling Proprietor's Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, 356
F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966); Cooney v. American Horse
Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 430 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
be decided differently. Given the lack of a right to a hearing, or
procedures such as were applied in Deesen v. Professional Golfer's
Ass'n,193 there can be no assurance that the four-or-five year rule
is not arbitrary. For the same reasons, there is no adequate basis
for judicial review.
5. Rule of Reason Analysis
Under the rule of reason, the NFL would be required to show
that challenged restraints reasonably relate to the needs which
brought them into being; that they are no more restrictive than
necessary; and that less restrictive alternatives are not available.
Since these are essentially the requirements under the second
part of the Silver test, a brief summary of the analysis will suffice.
The four-or-five year rule does not reasonably relate to any need
which brought it into existence. The rule does not facilitate a leg-
islative policy to provide for greater in-person attendance at col-
lege football games. Colleges should not be used as a substitute
for a farm system. Encouraging a college education will not over-
ride the objective of fostering economic competition embodied in
the antitrust laws. The NFL is not in a position to determine
whether it would be advantageous for a player to complete his
college career before turning professional. The four-or-five year
rule is also more restrictive than necessary. The rule prevents
players who have talent sufficient to compete in the League from
participating. It also bars every player from competing in the
NFL regardless of whether he wants a college education, or is
mentally or financially capable of attending college. Nor has the
League developed definite standards to determine whether a col-
lege player may safely compete in the League. Less restrictive al-
ternatives are available. The League teams could provide
scholarships for those players who wished to attend school during
the off season or at night. The League could also provide a "hard-
ship draft" or provide for a right to a hearing to determine
whether there are legitimate reasons as to why a player would be
entitled to a waiver of the rule. Finally, it is manifestly unreason-
able for the League to concertedly refuse to deal with college
players in the absence of any procedural due process right.
V. CONCLUSION
The National Football League has enacted a rule which effec-
tively denies a college football player the opportunity to partici-
pate in the League unless he has completed his collegiate football
193. See note 82 supra.
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career. There can be little argument that professional sports
leagues are entitled to develop rules which are reasonably neces-
sary to ensure that the League continues to operate effectively.
However, when these rules are no longer within the realm of rea-
son and become arbitrary and overbroad, it is proper for a court
to strike them down for violating the Sherman Act. In an action
challenging the NFL's four-or-five year rule, a court should care-
fully scrutinize the rule to determine whether it is reasonable or
is arbitrary and overbroad.
Traditionally, two methods have been followed by courts to de-
termine the reasonableness of collective actions. In cases dealing
with group boycotts which are arguably motivated by anticompe-
titive desires, or where no provision for a hearing is made in chal-
lenging the regulation, courts have found the rule to be illegal per
se unless the Silver exception is applicable. Current procedures
followed by the NFL do not include a provision for a hearing for
collegiate athletes who wish to enter the League. The four-or-five
year rule does not qualify for a Silver exception because the rule
does not reasonably relate to the needs which brought it into
existence and it is more restrictive than necessary.
There is, however, a rather powerful argument that the four-or-
five year rule should be subject to a rule of reason analysis. Pro-
fessional sports leagues do not fall within the traditional mold of
group boycotts to which the per se label attaches. The fact that
these leagues may enact rules which are reasonably necessary for
the league to function smoothly also lends credence to this argu-
ment. In cases dealing with rules similar to the NFL's rule, how-
ever, courts have not found this reasoning to be persuasive
finding the rules to be illegal per se. In light of this, it appears
that Herschel Walker may receive a preliminary injunction al-
lowing him to compete in the NFL.
There are any number of actions the NFL might follow with re-
gard to Walker. It might choose to do nothing and hope that
Walker elects to pursue the elusive Heisman Trophy or a career
in the Canadian Football League. Should Walker bring an action
challenging the rule, the League may elect to waive the rule, an
action it has taken in the past. Such an action would allow the
League to perpetuate the rule, at least in form, but it would
render the rule meaningless should this conduct be followed each
time it is challenged. The final and preferable alternative would
be for the NFL to enact a "hardship draft" similar to the one pro-
vided by the National Basketball Association or to develop stan-
dards which help to determine the physical capability of a young
athlete to compete in the League. The latter alternative would al-
low the League to capitalize on its most persuasive argument sup-
porting the rule, that being the concern for the safety of the
athlete in participating in the League. It would also enable the
league to qualify for the due process requirement under Silver. If
the NFL were to enact either a "hardship draft" or standards
which reasonably determined the physical capabilities of a col-
lege player to compete in the NFL, the four-or-five year rule
should survive an antitrust challenge under a rule of reason or a
Silver analysis.
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